

16 October 1946

TO : CHIEF, ICAPS

FROM : CHIEF, INTELLIGENCE STAFF, ORE

REFERENCE: (a) C.I.G. 16
(b) H.I.I. Directive No. 1, para. 6
(c) C.I.G. Admin. Order No. 3 (Revised), para. 3

SUBJECT : Intelligence Estimates Prepared by the Central Intelligence Group

1. In response to your oral request, I submit herein comment and recommendations with respect to Reference (a).

2. As one of those who drafted Reference (b), I recall that it was anticipated that the concurrence or dissent of the Departmental intelligence agencies concerned would be elicited by the submission of C.I.G. estimates to the I.A.B. prior to their dissemination. The unanimous concurrence of the I.A.B. was not required, provided that any substantial dissent was noted.

3. This concept underlies Reference (c). It was considered that the I.A.B. was on too high a level to engage in the detailed revision of draft estimates, either to obtain unanimous concurrence or to note substantial dissent, actual experience with the J.I.C. proving that point. To obviate an issue's first appearing on that level, a representative group corresponding to the I.A.B., but within C.R.S. (O.R.E.) was contemplated, to review draft estimates and amend them or note dissent while the material was in a more malleable condition. This group was modelled after the Senior Team, J.I.S., but, to obviate the deadlocks which too frequently occur in J.I.S. (or the corollary necessity to water down sense in order to obtain concurrence), the Chief, C.R.S. was given a deciding voice, subject only to the notation of substantial dissent. Thus estimates would reach the I.A.B. with assurance of concurrence or with any dissent carefully formulated under the influence of joint consideration.

4. It should be noted in this connection that a full-time group such as that envisaged in Reference (c) is preferable to any ad hoc group. Full-time participation inculcates a broader point of view and leads to two-way representation, regardless of the

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technical distinction between "detailed" and "assigned." I know that as a member of the Senior Team, J.I.S., I was as often engaged in persuading my principal to a "joint" point of view, which he could not obtain from any of his subordinates within G-2, as I was in urging the G-2 point of view on J.I.S.

6. The group envisaged in Reference (c) was never activated because C.R.S. never reached the stage of readiness to produce estimates. Reference (c) was rescinded by C.I.G. Directive No. 14.

6. ORR 1 is typical of the estimates which O.R.E. expects to produce frequently when adequately manned. Its preparation, of which a detailed account is contained in the Appendix, is not typical of the procedures to be followed in such cases. By reason of special circumstances existing at the time, a formal coordination of that paper prior to its submission to the Director was physically impossible within the time limit set. It can be said, however, that it was coordinated in effect, inasmuch as it was:

a. Based on JIS 80/23

b. Checked against a simultaneous J.I.C. response to a similar request.

c. Reviewed by a representative group of Departmental specialists, who concurred in it subject to amendments which were subsequently made, indicating no substantial dissent. This statement could be questioned only with respect to para. 2, regarding which it can be argued that (1) the issue was rhetorical rather than substantial; (2) the matter lies clearly within the primary competence of State, the specialists from which did concur.

7. Solution of the problem presented in C.I.G. 16 would be facilitated by solution of two other pending problems:

a. The allocation of primary intelligence responsibilities, which might obviate any question of obtaining the concurrence of a Department in a matter lying within the primary competence of another.

b. The disposition of the J.I.S., with particular reference to its incorporation in O.R.E.

8. With respect to C.I.G. 16 itself, I recommend that a counterproposal be made reviving, with suitable modification, the idea contained in Reference (c) and para. 3 above. This group should constitute (or be the nucleus of) the Projects Division.

Intelligence Staff, ORE, which has been given similar functions. This is precisely the point at which the purpose indicated in para. 3 can best be accomplished and at which the influence indicated in para. 4 can be most effective.

LUDWELL L. MONTAGNE
Chief, Intelligence Staff
Research and Evaluation

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Acting Executive		INFORMATION
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Col. Montague took the original
over to Mr. Edgar immediately.

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